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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT,
1960-1961 TERM*
WILLIAM H. DEPARCQt
FOR THE FIFTH SUCCESSIVE YEAR, it is my pleasant task to review
with you the actions of the United States Supreme Court in
the term just ended in cases arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.' At first blush the term just ended was not an en-
couraging one for railroad employees. Since the well-known Rogers
case2 in 1957 the Supreme Court has been reviewing on the merits,
always at the instance of the employee who was unsuccessful in the
court below, an average of about five FELA cases per year. Last
term it reviewed only two cases on the merits. One of those two
cases was especially notable because in it, the Court for the first
time in a quarter of a century set aside, on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, a judgment for plaintiff which had been
affirmed by the courts below. A close look at the cases, both the two
reviewed on the merits and the fourteen which the Court refused
to review, is required to see if the era introduced by the Rogers
case has really come to an end.
The history-making case was that of Mary Henagan, whose
judgment against the New Haven was reversed by the Supreme
Court, though the courts below had held the evidence sufficient to
raise a jury issue.3 Certiorari was granted during the preceding
term of the Court, and I discussed the case, as it stood then, with
you when last I spoke on this subject.4 Mary Henagan was thrown
against the counter of the grill car in which she was a waitress when
the engineer made an emergency application of the brakes, in an
* The substance of this article was presented as an address at the 1961 annual
convention of the National Association of Claimant's Compensation Attorneys in Bos-
ton, Mass.
f Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1 DeParcq, The Supreme Court and the Federal Employers Liability Act, 1956-
1957 Term, 36 Texas L. Rev. 145 (1957), 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 22 (1958) (1957-1958'
Term), 44 Minn. L. Rev. 707 (1960) (1958-1959 Term), 14 Okla. L. Rev. 159 (1961)
(1959-1960 Term).
2 Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957). See DeParcq, The Supreme
Court and the Federal Employers Liability Act, 1959-1960 Term, 14 Okla. L. Rev. 159,
160 n.6 (1961).
3 New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Henagan, 364 U.S. 441 (1960), reversing 272 F.2d
153 (lst Cir. 1959).
4 Supra note 2, at 167-169.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
unsuccessful attempt to avoid hitting a woman who had stepped
onto the tracks of the Providence station in a successful attempt to
commit suicide. Mrs. Henagan acquired a paranoid psychosis, be-
lieving herself to be responsible for the woman's death and fearing
that she would be tried for murder. She made a rather thin claim
of negligence, asserting that if the engineer had used due care he
might have seen the woman on the tracks sooner and avoided run-
ning over her. The trial judge, Judge Charles Wyzanski, refused to
set the verdict aside, though he said that the jury had reached "a
preposterous conclusion" as to causation and that "there was no
evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the engineer."
The First Circuit affirmed, although it indulged in what I referred
to in last year's speech as Supreme Court Baiting6 by announcing
such startling propositions as that plaintiffs no longer have the bur-
den of persuasion as to negligence in FELA cases, and that "the
faintest scintilla of evidence" is enough to make a jury issue.7
The Supreme Court took the bait. It granted the railroad's
petition for certiorari last term," and this term reversed in a per
curiam opinion in which, after a brief review of the facts, the
Court simply stated:
We have examined the trial record and hold that the
proofs were insufficient to submit to the jury the question
whether employer negligence played a part in the emer-
gency application of the brakes which allegedly produced
the respondent's injury.9
Justices Black and Douglas were the only dissenters. They thought
the evidence of negligence was sufficient, and asserted also that if
the case were to be reversed it should be for a new trial rather than
for judgment for the defendant. 10 Thus they adhered-to the view,
which they have been urging without success for a good many
years, that the Constitution prohibits directed verdicts in federal
courts."
5 272 F.2d 155, 156 (1st Cir. 1959).
6 Supra note 2, at 168-169.
7 Supra note 5, at 158.
8 362 U.S. 967 (1960).
9 Supra note 3, at 442.
10 Id. at 442-443.
11 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943) (Dissenting Opinion).
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Probably it is wrong to make too much of this case. The evi-
dence of the eyewitnesses was that the woman did not step onto the
track until the engine was within forty feet, and there was testimony
that under the conditions, the minimum distance in which the
train might have been stopped was eighty feet. 2 Like the Herdman
case 13 in 1957 and the Inman case 14 in 1959, the Henagan case per-
haps shows no more than that some accidents do happen without
negligence by the railroad, and that the charge that the Supreme
Court has made an insurer of the carriers is demonstrably false. It
is interesting, though, that in this case the Supreme Court took the
plaintiff's judgment away though it had been approved by the
lower courts, even if they may have had their tongue in cheek in
approving it. In Herdman and Inman, the Supreme Court merely
affirmed the action of lower courts in holding that defendant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. So far as I can find, the
last instance, until Henagan, of the Supreme Court reversing, on
sufficiency of evidence grounds, a plaintiff's verdict which had been
affirmed below, was a 1936 case in which the plaintiff's lawyer was
a young Minnesota attorney named Harold E. Stassen. 5 Thus,
Henagan is surely a landmark but it is probably not a lighthouse,
pointing any new direction of the courts below.
The other case decided on the merits last term was Eugene
Maynard's attempt to collect damages for injuries he suffered, as
to which his employer claimed he had given a release." Admittedly
he had given a release, and there was no question of fraud, duress
or undue influence. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
a nonsuit because of the release,17 but the United States Supreme
Court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury issue
as to whether he had received consideration for it. It also held that
the validity of a release, challenged for want of consideration in an
FELA case, is a federal question, and it is not to be decided in the
light of state standards. The check which the railroad gave May-
nard at the time he signed the release was for the exact amount he
would have been paid had he not missed work because of his in-
12 Supra note 5, at 157.
13 Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
14 Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
15 Chicago G.W. R. v. Rambo, 298 U.S. 99 (1936).
16 Maynard v. Durham & Southern Ry., 365 U.S. 160 (1961).
17 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249 (1960).
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jury. He claimed that the check was not consideration for the re-
lease, but merely his pay check, rightfully owing. There was other
evidence that the railroad owed him no back wages, that it was
neither required to nor in the habit of paying men for lost time.
Six members of the Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, said:
It is not for the judges to resolve the conflict and to con-
clude that one side or the other was right. The issue of
fact that it presented is one on which fair-minded jurors
might honestly differ."'
Justices Whittaker and Harlan dissented. They agreed that a re-
lease is invalid if the only consideration given is wages to which
the employee had an absolute right, but they could find no evi-
dence to support his claim that he had any right to wages for the
time he did not work. Justice Frankfurter filed a statement setting
forth his familiar position that to review cases turning on assess-
ment of the trial testimony is "an obvious misuse of our discre-
tionary jurisdiction" and that the writ should be dismissed as im-
providently granted.' 9 Justice Frankfurter fails to explain why he
voted on the merits in the Henagan case, which some persons
might have thought to have turned on an assessment of trial testi-
mony.
In one case this term the Court followed the course which
Justice Frankfurter has so frequently urged, and did dismiss the
writ of certiorari which it had earlier granted.20 The Florida East
Coast Railway suspected that Bert Smith, one of its flagmen, was
physically unable to perform his duties. They undertook to verify
this suspicion by requiring him to walk one mile along the track,
as a "field test." He fell in the course of this and was injured. It is
not clear whether the intermediate Florida appellate court took
his judgment away because it thought his only remedy for being
required to take such a field test was under the Railway Labor Act,
or whether it deemed the evidence insufficient to show that the rail-
road was negligent in requiring the field test. The question pre-
sented in the petition for certiorari was equally ambiguous. After
hearing argument on the case a bare majority of the Court joined
18 Supra note 16, at 163.
19 Id. at 164.
20 Smith v. Butler, cert. granted, 364 U.S. 869 (1960).
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in a brief per curiam opinion which asserted that the petition had
raised solely a question regarding the bearing of the Railway Labor
Act, and that after argument it became clear that the decisions in
the Florida courts did not turn on that issue. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari was dismissed.21 Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Black and Justice Douglas dissented. They did not agree
that the petition had raised solely a question about the Railway
Labor Act and said it had tendered the familiar issue of whether a
reviewing court had properly taken away an FELA verdict on suf-
ficiency of the evidence grounds.
The case is a baffling one. The majority concludes that the
Florida decisions did not turn on the Railway Labor Act. The
dissenters agree. Thus, the Court is apparently unanimous in read-
ing the proceedings below as going to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. We know that many members of the Court do not think it
should review sufficiency of evidence cases, but every member of
the Court except Justice Frankfurter has explicitly stated that
when four members of the Court vote to grant certiorari on a suf-
ficiency of the evidence case, the Court is obliged to decide the case
on the merits. Here four members of the Court thought that was
the issue on which they had granted certiorari, yet the Court dis-
misses the writ. Seemingly, what the majority holds is that it will
vote, albeit reluctantly, where review has been granted explicitly
on sufficiency grounds, but that if a majority think the petition was
granted on a different ground, and later find that ground unten-
able, they are free to dismiss the writ even though four Justices find
in the petition a sufficiency issue. Certainly, such a view introduces
a rather weird and fortuitous technicality into the certiorari prac-
tice, but at least it is a situation not likely to recur often. Counsel
can escape such a trap by formulating with clarity the Questions
Presented in the petition for certiorari.
In addition to the cases I have described thus far in which the
Court heard oral argument, it disposed of a number of cases with-
out argument by denial of certiorari. Railroads petitioned for certi-
orari in five cases; all five petitions were denied. Two of the cases
raised questions as to the measure of damages. The Court refused
to review a splendid decision from the Second Circuit holding that
21 366 U.S. 161 (1961).
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the jury is not to take income taxes into account in computing
damages,22 and a fine Third Circuit decision permitting recovery
for impairment of future earning power where the plaintiff was
still employed by the railroad, at a higher salary than before the
injury, but was so disabled that he would have difficulty getting
any other job.23 The Court denied certiorari also in two quite
routine cases where the conclusion of the courts below that the
railroad was liable for plaintiff's injuries or death seems required
on the plainest principles.24
The last, and most interesting of the cases in which a carrier
petitioned unsuccessfully for review was from a decision of the
Second Circuit that sand seen on the platform of a switch engine
prior to the accident was sufficient to support a jury finding that
the railroad, through its employees, either knew or should have
known that a dangerously slippery condition existed.25 As a straight
FELA claim, this would have been straightforward enough. As
Judge Charles E. Clark wrote for the Second Circuit:
The sustained efforts of the Supreme Court majority to
preserve the integrity of the jury system, over vigorous
dissent that the time taken with these cases is not well
spent, show that this verdict is not to be upset.26
But the case was also submitted to the jury on a theory that the
presence of temporary foreign matter, such as sand, was a violation
of the Boiler Inspection Act. The Second Circuit agreed with this,
though several of the judges concurred quite reluctantly, but felt
that the rule of the well-known Lilly case,27 which the author
briefed and argued, required the result, even though in the case
before them there was no violation of an ICC rule, as there had
been in Lilly.
22 McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 US. 870 (1960).
23 Wiles v. New York, C. & St. L. R., 283 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 900 (1960).
24 Missouri Pac. R. v. Mendoza, 337 S.W2d 622 (rex. Civ. App. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 818 (1961); Boston & M. R.R. v. Hall, 284 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 817 (1961).
25 Calabritto v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 287 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. de.
nied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
26 Id. 287 F2d 394, at 395.
27 Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R., 317 U.S. 481 (1943).
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Employees petitioned for certiorari in eleven cases. Two peti-
tions were granted. One was the Maynard case,28 involving the ade-
quacy of consideration for a release, where, as I have said, the
Court held for the employee. The other case in which review was
granted has not yet been heard by the Court.' It involves a hold-
ing by a West Virginia court that the railroad was entitled to a
directed verdict because of misrepresentations by the employee
more than six years before the accident as to his health and physical
condition, even though these misrepresentations had no causal con-
nection with the accident.
In the nine cases which I regard as denials of review, I include
the Smith case,3° which I discussed earlier, involving the "field
test," where the Court first granted certiorari and later dismissed
the writ. Some of the others raised only routine questions. Thus in
one case a plaintiff, who had received a $50,000 verdict, sought a
new trial on the ground that the instructions, as he interpreted
them, were erroneous. The Illinois Supreme Court, which has not
been hostile to FELA plaintiffs, said: "We cannot perceive how
any such interpretation could be drawn. '31 I know well how plain-
tiff's counsel can find error in a record when the verdict has been
disappointingly small, but the interpretation plaintiff sought to
put on the verdict was certainly a forced one. It is not surprising
that certiorari was denied.
Nor am I surprised that the Court refused to review decisions
holding railroads not liable where the plaintiff was assaulted by an
intoxicated fellow employee not acting within the scope of his
employment,32 or where the plaintiff fell at lunch when his fellow
employee jerked his stool from under him as he was sitting down,8n
or where the employee, while off duty, left his hotel and came back
to the yard on his own business, and was injured in the process.3 4
I am a little suspicious of the last of these cases, as I am of any
FELA case where the only authorities relied on are lower court
28 Supra note 16.
29 Still v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., cert. granted, 365 U.S. 877 (1961).
30 Supra note 21.
31 Pinkstaff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 20 Ill. 2d 193, 170 N.E.2d 139, 143 (1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961).
32 Moreno v. New York Cent. R. Co., 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
33 Rogers v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879 (1961).
34 Wallace v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 239 Miss. 237, 120 So. 2d 131 (1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 862 (1960).
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decisions twenty or thirty years old, but in general these seem run-
of-the-mill cases, quite different from the kind of case which the
Court in recent years has been reviewing.
I am less sure about the other four cases where an employee's
petition for certiorari was denied. In one an employee of the Le-
noir Car Works sued the Southern Railroad, claiming he had con-
tracted silicosis. The Southern owned all the stock of Lenoir, but
the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found no evidence that it
dictated the management of Lenoir or that Lenoir was a mere ad-
junct of Southern, so as to make the Southern the employer of the
plaintiff within the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Su-
preme Court refused to review. 5 It really seems a little hard to
conceive of a railroad not dictating the management of its wholly-
owned subsidiary. But there is an important difference between a
trial court, sitting without a jury, finding a fact in a particular way,
and the same court directing a verdict in a jury case. I would not
think that a directed verdict could have stood up had this case been
tried to a jury. And even though it was a non-jury case, Justice
Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari3e
In another case there was conflicting medical evidence at the
trial as to whether plaintiff had recovered from his injuries. Plain-
tiff's counsel suggested in his closing argument that plaintiff might
be fired after the trial. The railroad's lawyer objected strongly, and
said that the jury was entitled to assume there would be no change
in plaintiff's status, and the court instructed the jury not to con-
sider any possibility that the plaintiff might be fired by the rairoad
as a result of the lawsuit. A few weeks after the trial the railroad,
without further medical examination, discharged the plaintiff on
the basis of the testimony at the trial of his own experts. Plaintiff
sought a new trial under Rule 60(b) but this was denied. The trial
court, and the Third Circuit, held that events after the trial are
not newly-discovered evidence, and that there was no proof that
the argument of the railroad's lawyer amounted to fraud or mis-
representation. The Supreme Court, Justice Black dissenting, re-
fused certiorari. 7 One may well assume that the railroad lawyer was
85 Garrett v. Southern Ry. Co., 278 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
:833 (1960).
36 Ibid.
37 Brown v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 282 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.s. 818 (1961).
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entirely sincere in his belief that plaintiff would not be discharged,
but can his client be permitted to act in a manner contrary to the
assurance its counsel had given the jury and the court? The issue
here goes not to such neat legal categories as fraud or misrepresen-
tation, but involves the integrity of the judicial process itself.
The Ninth Circuit, in another case which the Supreme Court
refused to review, held that grease on the grab iron of a car is not
a violation of the Safety Appliance Act.88 It distinguished the Lilly
case,89 where foreign matter on a locomotive was held to be a vio-
lation, on the ground that a locomotive is under the control of a
single railroad, while a car is used on many different lines, is in the
custody of consignees, and the railroad should not be under an
absolute duty as to it. Perhaps so, but the reluctance of the Ninth
Circuit to give a broad reading to the Act, and to the Lilly case,
contrasts sharply with the more liberal attitude of the Second Cir-
cuit, in the case involving the sand on the footwalk which I men-
tioned a few moments ago.
Finally there is a case from Ohio involving an engineer who
slipped and fell while descending the ladder from the cab to call
for instructions. The train had been stopped, and while it was
stopped one of the crew detected a defective brake beam. The
engineer was going to the wayside telephone to ask instructions
about this. There was no claim that anything was wrong with the
cab ladders, nor that carrier negligence played a part in the result.
Plaintiff claimed, rather, that the defective brake beam was a vio-
lation of the Safety Appliance Act. A verdict was directed against
plaintiff. This was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. That
court went out of its way to critize the recent FELA decisions of
the Supreme Court, and to argue that a plaintiff who has voluntarily
chosen a state court, in order to enjoy supposed procedural advan-
tages of that court, should have to live with the state notions of
what constitutes sufficient evidence of negligence. The relevance
of all this in a Safety Appliance Act case is not obvious. Finally the
court held that the defective brake beam could not be said to be
the, or even a, proximate cause of the engineer's fall.4" I had hoped
88 Collins v. Southern Pac. Co., 286 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
923 (1961).
89 Supra note 27.
40 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 171 Ohio St. 433, 171 N.E.2d 718 (1961), cert. de-
nied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961).
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that the decision four years ago in the Rogers case4 would put an
end to talk of "proximate cause," but the habits of state courts are
hard to break.
At the outset I told you that, at first blush, this was not an en-
couraging term for railroad employees, but that a close look at the
cases would be required to see if the Rogers era was really over. We
have made that close look. What conclusions can we draw?
The Henagan case 42 was an unusual one, but it is hard to
think too much has been lost by setting aside a plaintiff's verdict
in a case where the evidence of negligence was so thin that such
staunch supporters of the jury system, and of a liberal interpreta-
tion for the Act, as Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan and
Justice Clark could find no jury issue. Indeed the case may serve
a worthwhile purpose in demonstrating again the falsity of the
claims that the Court has converted FELA into an absolute liabil-
ity statute.
It is disappointing that the Court granted so few of the peti-
tions for certiorari by unsuccessful plaintiffs. In some of those cases,
as I have indicated, the decisions below seem to me erroneous. But
there is an encouraging conclusion to be drawn from reading the
cases, as I have, which the Supreme Court has refused to review.
They reveal a sympathetic and conscientious attempt to apply the
Act in the spirit of Rogers and its progeny. The last case I dis-
cussed, the Ohio case about the defective brake beam and proxi-
mate cause, is the only one of all these cases in which the lower
court displayed the hostile attitude toward FELA claims, and
toward Supreme Court decisions construing the Act, which was
once so common. It is noteworthy too, that there was not a single
case this year in which an employee petitioned for certiorari from
a decision in which his evidence of negligence was held to be in-
sufficient.
All the evidence is not yet in, and I may be guilty of the in-
defatigable optimism which is the hallmark of our profession. Yet
I cannot help but think that the meaning of this term is not that
the Rogers era has ended, but that the lesson of Rogers has been
41 Supra note 2.
42 Supra note 3.
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learned by the lower courts. The Supreme Court made it clear that
the jury was to decide fact issues, and trial judges and appellate
courts were not to substitute their judgment on the facts, so long
as reasonable men might differ about them. The ancient curse
words, "speculation and conjecture," were no longer to be a talis-
manic symbol upon invocation of which the jury verdict would
vanish into smoke. Finally, and most important of all, the Court,
despite heavy attack from its critics, granted review and reversed
in every case in which the lower courts remained intransigent in
the former approach. Finally, the lower courts have heeded this
lesson, and have stopped intruding on the proper concern of the
jury. If the Supreme Court were granting few petitions for certi-
orari now because it had yielded to the savage onslaughts of the
Harvard Law School, this would be a matter of grave concern. But
if the Supreme Court is granting few petitions now because there
are few cases in which the lower courts depart from the proper
standards, we have no cause for complaint. Let us hope that future
years prove that that is the meaning of the 1960-1961 term.
